1972 CIA Inspector General Report Confirms Heroin Complicity
Heroin Production
The CIA's policy of tolerance
towards its Laotian allies did not change even when they began producing
heroin to supply U.S. combat forces fighting in South Vietnam.
In 1968-69, CIA assets opened a
cluster of heroin laboratories in the Golden Triangle, the tri-border
area where Myanmar(Burma), Thailand, and Laos converge. When Hmong officers
loaded opium on the CIA's Air America and the Lao Army's commander
opened a heroin laboratory to supply U.S. troops in Vietnam, the Agency
was silent. In a secret internal report compiled in 1972, the CIA's
inspector-general said the following to explain their inaction:
The past involvement of many of
these officers in drugs is well known, yet their goodwill considerably
facilitates the military activities of Agency-supported irregulars.
All this heroin was smuggled
into South Vietnam where, by 1971, according to a White House survey, 34
percent of U.S. troops were addicted.
Instead of trying to restrain
drug trafficking by its Laotian assets, the Agency engaged in
concealment and cover-up. Professor McCoy recalled that when he went to
Laos to investigate in 1971, the Lao army commander graciously opened
his opium accounts but the U.S. mission stonewalled. In a Hmong village,
where he was investigating opium shipments on Air America, CIA
mercenaries ambushed his research team. A CIA operative threatened to
murder his Lao interpreter unless he quit.
When his book was in press, the
CIA's Deputy Director for Plans pressured his publisher to suppress it
and the CIA's general counsel demanded deletions of all references to
Agency complicity. After the book was published unaltered, CIA agents in
Laos pressed his sources to recant and convinced investigators from the
House Foreign Affairs Committee that his allegations were baseless.
Simultaneously, the CIA's
inspector-general conducted a secret internal investigation that
confirmed his allegations. "The war has clearly been our overriding
priority in Southeast Asia and all other issues have taken second
place," the inspector-general said in defense of their inaction on
drugs. "It would be foolish to deny this, and we see no reason to do
so."
Smack to Crack and the Outlaw Government
By 1971 the greatest threat to
the 400,000 member U.S. military force that had invaded Vietnam was not
Communist firepower or lack of air support, it was heroin. Ninety to
ninety nine percent pure, No. 4 heroin was being sold at roadside stands
by Vietnamese children, in army camps, and at sidewalk cigarette stands
throughout downtown Saigon. The heroin epidemic was considered so
pervasive that one U.S. authority told a Newsweek reporter that "Heroin
is wrecking the U.S. Army and creating a whole new class of American
addicts.
As the heroin epidemic surged
through the force structure the army's Criminal Investigation Division
(CID) uncovered incriminating evidence that South Vietnam Major General
Ngo Dzu, commander of II Corps, was "one of the chief traffickers" in
the country. The CID investigation also revealed that the Chief of the
Laotian general staff, General Ouane Rathikone, was "deeply involved."
The conclusions of the army
investigation were sent, through channels, to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon
which ignored the findings and assembled a spirited defense of General
Ngo Dzu. "There is no information available to me that in any shape,
manner or fashion would substantiate the charges" declared the U.S.
advisor to General Dzu.
That high officials in the South
Vietnamese, Laotian, and Thai governments were controlling the heroin
industry should have been as shocking as the information conveyed to the
police chief in the classic movie "Casablanca" when told of gambling at
Rick's American Cafe.
The Central Intelligence Agency
had been in Indochina since at least l949 and formed allegiances with
groups who had been trafficking in opium for centuries. The CIA
facilitated the transport logistics of the opium trade among it's allies
as part of it's mission, first to initiate a covert invasion of the
People's Republic of China using KMT irregulars, then in it's effort's
in support of the U.S. invasion of South Vietnam.
Shocking to some, unbelievable
to others, and consistently denied by the U.S. government, the U.S.
Government and CIA at best ignored, or as the record will show actively
participated in the facilitation of the illegal drug industry, that was
"wrecking the U.S. Army".
Operation PAPER, a covert
CIA/KMT invasion of China supported by Civil Air Transport (CAT) a CIA
proprietary airline was resoundingly crushed by Chinese soldiers in
1951. Two more invasions of China were attempted as the CIA inaccurately
predicted, as they would in Cuba in 1961, that large number's of
Chinese would spontaneously rise and join the fight. Each abortive
invasion met the same fate at the first.
After these defeats the war
lords of the KMT consolidated control of the Thai Burma border areas,
expanded their tradition of opium production and shipped much of its
contraband to Bangkok not only on mules but also on CAT C-47's.
After delivering arms from
Bangkok many KMT reloaded the transports with opium for the return trip.
This aspect of the KMT's existence was hardly covert as the New York
Times reported detailed accounts of the KMT's drug trafficking as early
as 1952. As the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army was repeatedly crushing
the CIA/KMT incursions the French were struggling to hold their colonial
possessions in Southeast Asia.
The war against the Vietnamese
had become increasingly unpopular in France and the French intelligence
and paramilitary operatives in Vietnam turned increasingly to the opium
business for financial resources.
Dubbed OPERATION X, this covert
initiative came to control most of the opium trade and incorporated
Corsican gangsters for the purposes of export. Service de Documentation
Extrieure et du Contre Espionage (SDECE) was the French equivalent of
the CIA and it's program of using illegal drugs to finance an unwanted
war was top secret, known only by a few high ranking French officials.
The SDECE used its planes to transport drugs from the highlands into the
urban markets and mobilized drug gangs to fight the liberation forces.
After the French defeat in 1954
the U.S. began its direct involvement to protect the Vietnamese from
what President Eisenhower described as the "red ruler's godless goons".
South Vietnam President Diem decided to fight the "godless goons" by
resurrecting the French drug distribution network.
As opium could not be grown in
Vietnam it had to be imported from Laos by air and the CIA's CAT (now
called Air America) and Vietnamese First Air Transport Group, under the
command of Col. Nguyen Ky (later Premiere) became the mules.
By 1960, CIA asset and head of the
South Vietnamese secret police, Ngo Dinh Nhu, working with Cholon
Chinese syndicates had increased the number of opium dens to 2,500 and
incorporated Corsican mobsters as part of the transport logistics. The
secret police had a well developed drug infrastructure with Col. Ky's
air force providing most of the transit bypassing customs and using air
force bases as distribution hubs.
By 1968-69 the Golden Triangle
was producing over 1,000 tons of raw opium, much of which was now being
refined into heroin for shipment to Europe, the U.S., and South Vietnam.
The CIA reported in 1971 that
much of the Golden Triangle increases in production "appears to be due
to the sudden increase in demand by a large and relatively affluent
market in South Vietnam". This, of course, was a reference to the
500,000 U.S. troops now stationed in Vietnam who could buy high grade
no. 4 heroin everywhere, from road side stands to 14 year old street
dealers.
In 1971 New York Congressman
Seymore Halpern reported that up to sixty thousand U.S. troops in South
Vietnam were either addicted or users of heroin. Other estimates placed
the number as high as 15 percent prompting Newsweek to report in part
""heroin addiction among U.S. troops is reaching epidemic proportions
and, in the view of many American officers, now poses a greater threat
to the young soldiers in Vietnam than Communist firepower does".
The Air America fleet, another
CIA proprietary which included Iran Contra Air Force officer Richard
Secord as its logistics person, became a factor in solidifying the power
of Hmong leader Vang Pao, who was given the authority to approve rice
delivery's and opium pickups to remote villages.
These villages had been separated by
rugged mountain terrain and the introduction of air communications not
only unified these tribes but provided them with advanced capabilities
of marketing their opium. "By flying bundles of raw opium from remote
villages to refineries, the CIA allowed the Hmong to continue their cash
crop income, thus reducing the Agency's direct costs in maintaining
tribal households."
Much of the opium transhipped by
Air America was converted into no. 4 heroin for the GI market in South
Vietnam. In 1958, after a neutralist government was elected in Laos,
prohibited by John Foster Dulles in the Grand Arena, the CIA financed a
right wing political coalition.
Within three months, the
neutralist government was replaced by the right wing which included
Cabinet Minister Phoumi a CIA asset. Phoumi had controlled the Laotian
opium traffic working in collusion with Corsican and Chinese smugglers
and went on to open opium dens in Vientiene, the capital city.
In 1962 Phoumi moved to
consolidate his control over the opium trade by establishing links with
Burmese traffickers. He appointed Laotian Army General, Ouane Rattiake,
Chairman of the Laotian Opium Administration and within several months
Ouane brought the first major opium caravans across the Mekong River.
General Ouane went on to become one of
the largest drug traffickers in the Golden Triangle using Laotian C-47s
and helicopters to open new trading relations with KMT and Shan
brokers. One of the largest shipments he is known to have organized was a
winding mile long 16 ton load carried over the jagged mountain terrain
on a 300 pack horse caravan, guarded by five hundred Laotian soldiers.
This caravan provoked a battle
that came to be known in the media as the 1967 Opium War. The
confrontation, between KMT drug units and the Shan warlords who were
delivering the drugs, was a fight to control the traffic in this region.
General Ouane entered the fight with Laotian jets and a paratroop
battalion decisively defeating the opposing forces and retrieved the 16
tons of opium.
The drug war between the KMT's
1,400 troops and Ouanes 1,800 paratroopers was reported in the U.S.
media, however, it's deeper implications and the connections with heroin
sales to U.S. GI's were overlooked. General Ouane consolidated this
victory by displacing the KMT forces from the Burmese border and using
the Laotian army to tax opium shipments.
Ouane operated five heroin
refinery's producing no.4 and his operation became the lead processor
for Burmese opium. This massive heroin operation was widely know to be
operating including a Time magazine article that reported "the kingpin
of the Laotian opium trade is General Ouane. He is reputed to own one of
Laos's two major opium refineries, and five smaller refineries
scattered along the Mekong".
Ouane, the Laotian Chief of
Staff, whose army was largely funded by the U.S., held a press
conference with U.S. reporters in 1971 where he was quoted as saying
"the opium traffic was a good thing, since it provided the Meo (Hmong)
tribesmen with a livelihood and kept them out of the hand of the
Communist Pathet Lao." Ouanes candor was apparently too much for the CIA
as he was reportedly forced to resign his army position several weeks
later, but not from his drug operations.
Heroin and Black Ghettos
Ouane, in the finest traditions
of free market entrepreneurship, responded to the GI demand for No.4 by
marketing his own brand name "Double U-O Globe" heroin and
increasing production to 10 kilos per day. Double U_O Globe was
following U.S. troop home as 8 kilos were seized in New Jersey and 16
kilos in New York in November 1971.
These large seizures, the GI problem
and increasing media attention led to President Nixon's "war on drugs".
Announced in June of 1971 Time magazine reported that the problem had
become exacerbated since it (heroin addiction) had been traditionally
"confined to black urban ghettos" and now it appeared the "disease has
come to invade the heartland of white, middle class America."
Fearing that heroin was moving
beyond the politically and racially segregated ghettos, Nixon declared a
"national emergency" and using rhetoric future politicians would borrow
and build upon pronounced that "America's Public Enemy No. l is drug
abuse". Part of Nixon's "War on Drugs" included cooperation between U.S.
drug enforcement personnel and police of other nations.
In 1971, the U.S. Bureau of
Narcotics (DEA) sent a team of agents to Laos to investigate the
problem. Upon their arrival they were prevented from conducting
investigations by the U.S. Embassy, the CIA, and the Laotian government.
The U.S. Embassy, apparently
unaware of "America's Pubic Enemy No. 1", defended this action by
claiming that U.S. narcotics agents would be violating Laotian
sovereignty as Laos had no legal prohibitions against drugs. The State
Department, which was then demonstrating its respect for the principle
of sovereignty in neighboring Vietnam, was concerned that any pressure
on the drug traffickers might damage the war effort.
The CIA and U.S. government role
in the Southeast Asian drug trade was considered logical and pragmatic
in a region where opium had been a primary cash commodity for centuries.
Opium was and is a mammoth agro-business in this area just as coca in
the Andean nations of South America. Covert aggression required
alliances with "powerful warlords who necessarily deal in drugs" in the
U.S. war against Communist's who did not, as the experience in post
revolutionary China demonstrated.
The CIA in 1972 denied any
involvement in the drug trade while expressing "some concern that local
officials with whom we are in contact... have been or may be still
involved in the drug business". The CIA went to explain that alliances
with Laotian military officers whose drug connections were well known
while their "goodwill facilitates Agency military irregulars".
The
report concluded with the observation that the war had been the
"overiding priority" and all other issue "have taken second place. It
would be foolish to deny this, and we see no reason to do so".
Excerpt of comments by: Alfred W.
McCoy, professor of Southeast Asian history at the University of
Wisconsin; author of "The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the
Global Drug Trade" (Lawrence Hill, 1991) and "The Politics of Heroin in
Southeast Asia" (1971).
At
"Drugs, Impunity and the CIA" A seminar sponsored by the Center for
International Policy's Intelligence Reform Project Dirksen Senate Office
Building, November 26, 1996.
(Colonel Thet Oo's "My Opium Operations")
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