Opium War in 1967,CIA confusion (2)

Opium War in Golden Triangle

However, at 12:00 noon on July 30 the staccato chatter of automatic weapons was suddenly interrupted by the droning roar of six T-28 prop fighters flying low up the Mekong River and then the deafening thunder of the five hundred pound bombs that came crashing down indiscriminately on Shans and KMT alike.

General Ouane, apparently somewhat disconcerted by the unforeseen outcome of his dealings with Chan Shee-fu, had decided to play the part of an outraged commander in chief defending his nation's territorial integrity. With Prime Minister Souvanna Phourna's full consent he had dispatched a squadron of T-28 fighters from Luang Prabang and airlifted the crack Second Paratroop Battalion (Capt. Kong Le's old unit) up to Ban Houei Sai.

General Ouane took personal command of the operation and displayed all of the tactical brilliance one would expect from a general who had just received his nation's highest state decoration, "The Grand Cross of the Million Elephants and the White Parasol".  

Once the Second Paratroop Battalion had gone upriver to Ban Khwan and taken up a blocking position just south of the battlefield, the T-28s began two solid days of bombing and strafing at the rate of four or five squadron sorties daily.

To ensure against a possible retaliatory attack on Ban Houei Sai, General Ouane ordered two marine launches to patrol the upper reaches of the Mekong near Ban Khwan. Finally, two regular Laotian infantry battalions began moving down the old caravan trail from Muong Mounge to cut off the only remaining escape route.

Under the pressure of the repeated bombing attacks, the four hundred surviving Shans piled into the boats tied up along the embankment and retreated across the Mekong into Burma, leaving behind eighty-two dead, fifteen mules, and most of the opium.  

Lacking boats and unwilling to abandon their heavy equipment, the KMT troops fled north along the Mekong, but only got six miles before their retreat was cut off by the two Laotian infantry battalions moving south from Muong Mounge.

When the Shans and KMT had abandoned Ban Khwan, the Second Paratroop Battalion swept the battlefield, gathered up the opium and sent it downriver to Ban Houei Sai. Reinforcements were flown up from Vientiane, and superior numbers of Laotian army troops surrounded the KMT.   

Following two weeks of tense negotiations, the KMT finally agreed to pay General Ouane an indemnity of $7,500 for the right to return to Thailand. According to Thai police reports, some seven hundred KMT troops crossed the Mekong into Thailand on August 19, leaving behind seventy dead, twenty-four machine guns, and a number of dead mules.

Although the Thai police made a pro forma attempt at disarming the KMT, the troops clambered aboard eighteen chartered buses and drove off to Mae Salong with three hundred carbines, seventy machine guns, and two recoilless rifles.  

Gen. Ouane Rattikone was clearly the winner of this historic battle. His troops had captured most of the sixteen tons of raw opium, and only suffered a handful of casualties. Admittedly, his lumber mill was damaged and his opium refinery had been burned to the ground, but this loss was really insignificant, since General Ouane reportedly operated another five refineries between Ban Khwan and Ban Houei Sai.   

His profits from the confiscated opium were substantial, and displaying the generosity for which he is so justly famous, he shared the spoils with the men of the Second Paratroop Battalion. Each man reportedly received enough money to build a simple house on the outskirts of Vientiane.   

The village of Ban Khwan itself emerged from the conflagration relatively unscathed; when the people started moving back across the Mekong River three days after the battle, they found six burned-out houses, but other than that suffered no appreciable Loss.  

At the time it was fought, the 1967 Opium War struck most observers, even the most sober, as a curious historical anachronism that conjured up romantic memories of China's warlords in the 1920s and bandit desperadoes of bygone eras.

However, looking back on it in light of events in the Golden Triangle over the last five years-particularly the development of large-scale production of no. 4 heroin-the 1967 Opium War appears to have been a significant turning point in the growth of Southeast Asia's drug traffic.

Each group's share of Myanmar's opium exports and its subsequent role in the growth of the Golden Triangle's heroin industry were largely determined by the historic battle and its aftermath.

KMT caravans still carry the overwhelming percentage of Myanmar's opium exports, and Shan caravans have continued to pay the KMT duty when they enter Thailand. Chan Shee-fu, of course, was the big loser; he left $500,000 worth of raw opium, thousands of dollars in arms and mules, and much of his prestige lying in the mud at Ban Khwan.

Moreover, Chan Shee-fu represented the first and last challenge to KMT control over the Shan States opium trade and that challenge was decisively defeated. Since the destruction of Chan Shee-fu's convoy, Shan military leaders have played an increasingly unimportant role in their own opium trade; Shan caravans usually have less than a hundred mules, and their opium refineries are processing only a small percentage of the opium grown in the Shan States.

However, General Ouane's troops won the right to tax Myanmar opium entering Laos, a prerogative formerly enjoyed by the KMT, and the Ban Houei Sai region later emerged as the major processing center for Myanmar opium.

However, General Ouane's troops won the right to tax Burmese opium entering Laos, a prerogative formerly enjoyed by the KMT, and the Ban Houei Sai region later emerged as the major processing center for Myanmar opium. 

(Colonel Thet Oo's "My Opium Operations")

Opium War in 1967,CIA confusion (1)

Opium War in Golden Triangle

General Ma had his chance as mediator in early 1967 when Generals Tuan and Ly began receiving disturbing information about Chan Shee-fu's activities in the Shan States. The KMT's radio network was sending back reports that the Shan warlord's brokers were buying up unprecedented quantities of opium in the northern Shan and Wa states.

In February, Chan Shee-fu (Khun Sa) had delivered a de facto declaration of war when he demanded that KMT caravans trading in the Wa States pay him the same transit tax that his caravans had to pay the KMT whenever they crossed into Thailand or Laos. When Chan Shee-fu's caravan of three hundred mules assembled in June 1967 it was carrying sixteen tons of raw opium worth $500,000 wholesale in Chiangmai.   

With his share of the profits, Chan Shee-fu could purchase at least one thousand new carbines and expand his army from two thousand to three thousand men, a force almost equal in size to the combined thirty-two hundred troops of the KMT Third and Fifth armies. If Chan Shee-fu's caravan reached Laos, the fifteen-year dominance of the KMT would be in jeopardy. 

The point was not lost on the KMT generals, and through General Ma's mediation, the two feuding generals agreed to resolve their differences and form a combined army to destroy Chan Shee-fu.   

In June the main body of Chan Shee-fu's convoy left Ving Ngun and set out on a two-hundred-mile trek toward Ban Khwan, a small Laotian lumber town on the Mekong River which Gen. Ouane Rattikone had designated the delivery point when he placed an advance order for this enormous shipment with Chan Shee-fu's broker, a Chinese merchant from Mae Sai, Thailand. 

The caravan was to deliver the opium to the general's refinery at Ban Khwan. As the heavily loaded mules plodded south through the monsoon downpours, the convoy was joined by smaller caravans from market towns like Tang Yang, so that by the time it reached Kengtung City its single-file column of five hundred men and three hundred mules stretched along the ridgelines for over a mile.  

From the moment the caravan left Ving Ngun, it was kept under surveillance by the KMT's intelligence network, and the radio receivers at Mae Salong hummed with frequent reports from the mountains overlooking the convoy's line of march. After merging their crack units into a thousand-man expeditionary corps, Generals Tuan and Ly sent their forces into the Shan States with orders to intercept the convoy and destroy it.   

Several days later the KMT expeditionary force ambushed Chan Shee-fu's main column east of Kengtung City near the Mekong River, but his rearguard counterattacked and the opium caravan escaped.  After crossing the Mekong into Laos on July 14 and 15, Chan Shee-fu's troops hiked down the old caravan trail from Muong Mounge and reached Ban Khwan two days later.  

Shortly after they arrived, the Shan troops warned the Laotian villagers that the KMT were not far behind and that there would probably be fighting. As soon as he heard this news, the principal of Ban Khwan's elementary school raced downriver to Ton Peung, where a company of Royal Laotian Army troops had its field headquarters.

The company commander radioed news of the upcoming battle to Ban Houei Sai and urged the principal to evacuate his village. During the next ten days, while Ban Khwan's twenty families moved all their worldly possessions across the Mekong into Thailand, Chan Shee-fu's troops prepared for a confrontation.  

Ban Khwan is hardly a likely battlefield: the village consists of small clearings hacked out of a dense forest, fragile stilted houses and narrow winding lanes, which were then mired in knee-deep, monsoon-season mud. A lumber mill belonging to General Ouane sat in the only large clearing in the village, and it was here that the Shans decided to make their stand. 

In many ways it was an ideal defensive position: the mill is built on a long sand embankment extending a hundred feet into the Mekong and is separated from the surrounding forest by a lumberyard, which had become a moat like sea of mud. The Shans parked their mules along the embankment, scoured the nearby towns for boats, and used cut logs lying in the lumberyard to form a great semicircular barricade in front of the mill.

The KMT expeditionary force finally reached Ban Khwan on July 26 and fought a brief skirmish with the Shans in a small hamlet just outside the village. That same day the Laotian army's provincial commander flew up from Ban Houei Sai in an air force helicopter to deliver a personal message from General Ouane: he ordered them all to get out of Laos.

The KMT scornfully demanded $250,000 to do so, and Chan Shee-fu radioed his men from Burma, ordering them to stay put. After several hundred reinforcements arrived from Mae Salong, the KMT troops attacked the Shan barricades on July 29. Since both sides were armed with an impressive array of .50 caliber machine guns, 60 mm. mortars, and 57 mm. recoilless rifles, the firefight was intense, and the noise from it could be heard for miles.

(Colonel Thet Oo's "My Opium Operations")

CIA Inside Story (A Golden-Triangle Poppy)

1972 CIA Inspector General Report Confirms Heroin Complicity

Heroin Production

The CIA's policy of tolerance towards its Laotian allies did not change even when they began producing heroin to supply U.S. combat forces fighting in South Vietnam. 

In 1968-69, CIA assets opened a cluster of heroin laboratories in the Golden Triangle, the tri-border area where Myanmar(Burma), Thailand, and Laos converge. When Hmong officers loaded opium on the CIA's Air America and the Lao Army's commander opened a heroin laboratory to supply U.S. troops in Vietnam, the Agency was silent. In a secret internal report compiled in 1972, the CIA's inspector-general said the following to explain their inaction:

The past involvement of many of these officers in drugs is well known, yet their goodwill considerably facilitates the military activities of Agency-supported irregulars.

All this heroin was smuggled into South Vietnam where, by 1971, according to a White House survey, 34 percent of U.S. troops were addicted.

Instead of trying to restrain drug trafficking by its Laotian assets, the Agency engaged in concealment and cover-up. Professor McCoy recalled that when he went to Laos to investigate in 1971, the Lao army commander graciously opened his opium accounts but the U.S. mission stonewalled. In a Hmong village, where he was investigating opium shipments on Air America, CIA mercenaries ambushed his research team. A CIA operative threatened to murder his Lao interpreter unless he quit.

When his book was in press, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans pressured his publisher to suppress it and the CIA's general counsel demanded deletions of all references to Agency complicity. After the book was published unaltered, CIA agents in Laos pressed his sources to recant and convinced investigators from the House Foreign Affairs Committee that his allegations were baseless.

Simultaneously, the CIA's inspector-general conducted a secret internal investigation that confirmed his allegations. "The war has clearly been our overriding priority in Southeast Asia and all other issues have taken second place," the inspector-general said in defense of their inaction on drugs. "It would be foolish to deny this, and we see no reason to do so."

Smack to Crack and the Outlaw Government

By 1971 the greatest threat to the 400,000 member U.S. military force that had invaded Vietnam was not Communist firepower or lack of air support, it was heroin. Ninety to ninety nine percent pure, No. 4 heroin was being sold at roadside stands by Vietnamese children, in army camps, and at sidewalk cigarette stands throughout downtown Saigon. The heroin epidemic was considered so pervasive that one U.S. authority told a Newsweek reporter that "Heroin is wrecking the U.S. Army and creating a whole new class of American addicts.

As the heroin epidemic surged through the force structure the army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) uncovered incriminating evidence that South Vietnam Major General Ngo Dzu, commander of II Corps, was "one of the chief traffickers" in the country. The CID investigation also revealed that the Chief of the Laotian general staff, General Ouane Rathikone, was "deeply involved."

The conclusions of the army investigation were sent, through channels, to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon which ignored the findings and assembled a spirited defense of General Ngo Dzu. "There is no information available to me that in any shape, manner or fashion would substantiate the charges" declared the U.S. advisor to General Dzu.

That high officials in the South Vietnamese, Laotian, and Thai governments were controlling the heroin industry should have been as shocking as the information conveyed to the police chief in the classic movie "Casablanca" when told of gambling at Rick's American Cafe.

The Central Intelligence Agency had been in Indochina since at least l949 and formed allegiances with groups who had been trafficking in opium for centuries. The CIA facilitated the transport logistics of the opium trade among it's allies as part of it's mission, first to initiate a covert invasion of the People's Republic of China using KMT irregulars, then in it's effort's in support of the U.S. invasion of South Vietnam.

Shocking to some, unbelievable to others, and consistently denied by the U.S. government, the U.S. Government and CIA at best ignored, or as the record will show actively participated in the facilitation of the illegal drug industry, that was "wrecking the U.S. Army".

Operation PAPER, a covert CIA/KMT invasion of China supported by Civil Air Transport (CAT) a CIA proprietary airline was resoundingly crushed by Chinese soldiers in 1951. Two more invasions of China were attempted as the CIA inaccurately predicted, as they would in Cuba in 1961, that large number's of Chinese would spontaneously rise and join the fight. Each abortive invasion met the same fate at the first.

After these defeats the war lords of the KMT consolidated control of the Thai Burma border areas, expanded their tradition of opium production and shipped much of its contraband to Bangkok not only on mules but also on CAT C-47's.

After delivering arms from Bangkok many KMT reloaded the transports with opium for the return trip. This aspect of the KMT's existence was hardly covert as the New York Times reported detailed accounts of the KMT's drug trafficking as early as 1952. As the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army was repeatedly crushing the CIA/KMT incursions the French were struggling to hold their colonial possessions in Southeast Asia.

The war against the Vietnamese had become increasingly unpopular in France and the French intelligence and paramilitary operatives in Vietnam turned increasingly to the opium business for financial resources.

Dubbed OPERATION X, this covert initiative came to control most of the opium trade and incorporated Corsican gangsters for the purposes of export. Service de Documentation Extrieure et du Contre Espionage (SDECE) was the French equivalent of the CIA and it's program of using illegal drugs to finance an unwanted war was top secret, known only by a few high ranking French officials. The SDECE used its planes to transport drugs from the highlands into the urban markets and mobilized drug gangs to fight the liberation forces.

After the French defeat in 1954 the U.S. began its direct involvement to protect the Vietnamese from what President Eisenhower described as the "red ruler's godless goons". South Vietnam President Diem decided to fight the "godless goons" by resurrecting the French drug distribution network.

As opium could not be grown in Vietnam it had to be imported from Laos by air and the CIA's CAT (now called Air America) and Vietnamese First Air Transport Group, under the command of Col. Nguyen Ky (later Premiere) became the mules. 

By 1960, CIA asset and head of the South Vietnamese secret police, Ngo Dinh Nhu, working with Cholon Chinese syndicates had increased the number of opium dens to 2,500 and incorporated Corsican mobsters as part of the transport logistics. The secret police had a well developed drug infrastructure with Col. Ky's air force providing most of the transit bypassing customs and using air force bases as distribution hubs.

By 1968-69 the Golden Triangle was producing over 1,000 tons of raw opium, much of which was now being refined into heroin for shipment to Europe, the U.S., and South Vietnam.

The CIA reported in 1971 that much of the Golden Triangle increases in production "appears to be due to the sudden increase in demand by a large and relatively affluent market in South Vietnam". This, of course, was a reference to the 500,000 U.S. troops now stationed in Vietnam who could buy high grade no. 4 heroin everywhere, from road side stands to 14 year old street dealers.

In 1971 New York Congressman Seymore Halpern reported that up to sixty thousand U.S. troops in South Vietnam were either addicted or users of heroin. Other estimates placed the number as high as 15 percent prompting Newsweek to report in part ""heroin addiction among U.S. troops is reaching epidemic proportions and, in the view of many American officers, now poses a greater threat to the young soldiers in Vietnam than Communist firepower does".

The Air America fleet, another CIA proprietary which included Iran Contra Air Force officer Richard Secord as its logistics person, became a factor in solidifying the power of Hmong leader Vang Pao, who was given the authority to approve rice delivery's and opium pickups to remote villages. 

These villages had been separated by rugged mountain terrain and the introduction of air communications not only unified these tribes but provided them with advanced capabilities of marketing their opium. "By flying bundles of raw opium from remote villages to refineries, the CIA allowed the Hmong to continue their cash crop income, thus reducing the Agency's direct costs in maintaining tribal households."

Much of the opium transhipped by Air America was converted into no. 4 heroin for the GI market in South Vietnam. In 1958, after a neutralist government was elected in Laos, prohibited by John Foster Dulles in the Grand Arena, the CIA financed a right wing political coalition.

Within three months, the neutralist government was replaced by the right wing which included Cabinet Minister Phoumi a CIA asset. Phoumi had controlled the Laotian opium traffic working in collusion with Corsican and Chinese smugglers and went on to open opium dens in Vientiene, the capital city.

In 1962 Phoumi moved to consolidate his control over the opium trade by establishing links with Burmese traffickers. He appointed Laotian Army General, Ouane Rattiake, Chairman of the Laotian Opium Administration and within several months Ouane brought the first major opium caravans across the Mekong River. 

General Ouane went on to become one of the largest drug traffickers in the Golden Triangle using Laotian C-47s and helicopters to open new trading relations with KMT and Shan brokers. One of the largest shipments he is known to have organized was a winding mile long 16 ton load carried over the jagged mountain terrain on a 300 pack horse caravan, guarded by five hundred Laotian soldiers.

This caravan provoked a battle that came to be known in the media as the 1967 Opium War. The confrontation, between KMT drug units and the Shan warlords who were delivering the drugs, was a fight to control the traffic in this region. General Ouane entered the fight with Laotian jets and a paratroop battalion decisively defeating the opposing forces and retrieved the 16 tons of opium.

The drug war between the KMT's 1,400 troops and Ouanes 1,800 paratroopers was reported in the U.S. media, however, it's deeper implications and the connections with heroin sales to U.S. GI's were overlooked. General Ouane consolidated this victory by displacing the KMT forces from the Burmese border and using the Laotian army to tax opium shipments.

Ouane operated five heroin refinery's producing no.4 and his operation became the lead processor for Burmese opium. This massive heroin operation was widely know to be operating including a Time magazine article that reported "the kingpin of the Laotian opium trade is General Ouane. He is reputed to own one of Laos's two major opium refineries, and five smaller refineries scattered along the Mekong".

Ouane, the Laotian Chief of Staff, whose army was largely funded by the U.S., held a press conference with U.S. reporters in 1971 where he was quoted as saying "the opium traffic was a good thing, since it provided the Meo (Hmong) tribesmen with a livelihood and kept them out of the hand of the Communist Pathet Lao." Ouanes candor was apparently too much for the CIA as he was reportedly forced to resign his army position several weeks later, but not from his drug operations.

Heroin and Black Ghettos

Ouane, in the finest traditions of free market entrepreneurship, responded to the GI demand for No.4 by marketing his own brand name "Double U-O Globe" heroin and increasing production to 10 kilos per day. Double U_O Globe was following U.S. troop home as 8 kilos were seized in New Jersey and 16 kilos in New York in November 1971. 

These large seizures, the GI problem and increasing media attention led to President Nixon's "war on drugs". Announced in June of 1971 Time magazine reported that the problem had become exacerbated since it (heroin addiction) had been traditionally "confined to black urban ghettos" and now it appeared the "disease has come to invade the heartland of white, middle class America."

Fearing that heroin was moving beyond the politically and racially segregated ghettos, Nixon declared a "national emergency" and using rhetoric future politicians would borrow and build upon pronounced that "America's Public Enemy No. l is drug abuse". Part of Nixon's "War on Drugs" included cooperation between U.S. drug enforcement personnel and police of other nations.

In 1971, the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics (DEA) sent a team of agents to Laos to investigate the problem. Upon their arrival they were prevented from conducting investigations by the U.S. Embassy, the CIA, and the Laotian government.

The U.S. Embassy, apparently unaware of "America's Pubic Enemy No. 1", defended this action by claiming that U.S. narcotics agents would be violating Laotian sovereignty as Laos had no legal prohibitions against drugs. The State Department, which was then demonstrating its respect for the principle of sovereignty in neighboring Vietnam, was concerned that any pressure on the drug traffickers might damage the war effort.

The CIA and U.S. government role in the Southeast Asian drug trade was considered logical and pragmatic in a region where opium had been a primary cash commodity for centuries. Opium was and is a mammoth agro-business in this area just as coca in the Andean nations of South America. Covert aggression required alliances with "powerful warlords who necessarily deal in drugs" in the U.S. war against Communist's who did not, as the experience in post revolutionary China demonstrated.

The CIA in 1972 denied any involvement in the drug trade while expressing "some concern that local officials with whom we are in contact... have been or may be still involved in the drug business". The CIA went to explain that alliances with Laotian military officers whose drug connections were well known while their "goodwill facilitates Agency military irregulars".

The report concluded with the observation that the war had been the "overiding priority" and all other issue "have taken second place. It would be foolish to deny this, and we see no reason to do so".

Excerpt of comments by: Alfred W. McCoy, professor of Southeast Asian history at the University of Wisconsin; author of "The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade" (Lawrence Hill, 1991) and "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" (1971).

At "Drugs, Impunity and the CIA" A seminar sponsored by the Center for International Policy's Intelligence Reform Project Dirksen Senate Office Building, November 26, 1996. 

(Colonel Thet Oo's "My Opium Operations")

The Great Victory (5)

Maing-yang Battle(Young Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was awarded the Thiha-Thura medal)

Frontline IB-14 (Kha-la-ya 14)

As soon as the news of Maing-yang battle reached the TOC-881 in Maing-khat and then LID-88 in Kengtung other army units in the area were put into action to support and reinforce the IB-11 inside Maing-yang Town.

Expecting that action CPB also sent out a large force to the Maing-lway area to intercept the army reinforcements and stop them there. Followings are the actions and engagements with the enemy of other army units sent into the Maing-lway and Maing-yang.

September 23

LID-88 CO Brigadier Thein Han had immediately sent three rifle companies of IB-14 kept as the reserve at Kengtung to Maing-yang that day once the news of the Maing-yang Battle reached him.

Battalion CO Lt. Colonel Aung Kyi and his three companies left Kengtung on midday and reached Maing-khat on the midday of September 24. He left one of his companies at Maing-khat as the reserve for TOC-881 and continued onto Maing-yang with two companies as the First Column of IB-14.

September 25

The IB-14’s First Column and its two companies marched the whole night of September 24 and reached Maing-lway at about midday of September 25. They engaged with about 100 strong CPB forces waiting for them at the Maing-lway Monastery.

The battle lasted for the rest of the day while the enemy there was multiplying by the new arrivals. By evening the enemy strength had reached to more than 400 and the IB-14 First Column had to tactically withdraw in the darkness as their casualties were alarmingly increasing.

September 26

In the morning of September 26 the IB-14’s First Column continued onto Main-yang as planned and reached the Village of Yang-khaing at 10 in the morning. The Column continued onto the Yin-kwe Mountain.

Meanwhile the IB-14’s Second Column was marching to engage the CPB forces at Maing-laway in September 27.

At there in the afternoon the First Column engaged with about 200 strong CPB forces waiting for them. The battle ensued but the casualties were low and the enemy finally withdrew towards east at about 6:30 in the evening.

September 28

In the morning of September 28 the IB-14’s First Column marched back to Main-lway to meet up with the IB-14’s Second Column clearing the CPB forces at Maing-lway.

The road to Maing-yang was wide open for the army reinforcements as the CPB blockages had been removed by the IB-14 Frist Column led by Lt. Col. Aung Kyi.

TOC-881 (Na-ba-ha 881)

September 25

TOC-881 Commander Colonel Ye Myint had to wait for the arrival of First Column and Second Column of IB-14 coming from Kengtung.

IB-14’s Second Column with two companies led by DCO Major Aung Myo Lwin left Kengtung on the midday of September 25 and reached Maing-khat on September 26. TOC-881 there and IB-14’s Second Column then started heading towards Maing-laway the same day.

September 27

TOC-881 and IB-14’s Second Column reached Maing-lway on midday September 27 and engaged with the enemy waiting there. About 150 strong CPB forces attacked them at the Maing-lway Monastery but later withdrew after a heavy battle involving hand-to-hand combats resulting heavy casualties on both sides.

September 28

In the morning of September 28 TOC-881 and IB-14’s Second Column met up with IB-14’s First Column in Maing-lway and they continued towards Maing-yang. At 3 in the afternoon the whole column reached Pharpun-phayar Hill near Maing-yang and engaged with some CPB forces there.

Captain Kyaw Zeya’s Company left in Maing-kaht also left there that night and by September 29 night our TOC-881 and the whole IB-14 were ready to reinforce the Maing-yang Garrison.

September 30

The whole column of TOC-881 and IB-14 left for Maing-yang early that morning and reached there at around 9 in the morning. They immediately cleared the La-min and Yan-shin hills used by the enemy as the bases in attacking our Aung-da-ghun Hill.

Our columns finally reached Aung-da-ghun Hill that afternoon. Various skirmishes some large and some small were still occurring around town as our columns continued on to clear the enemy remnants still in the town and the surrounds.

And more than 20 enemy combatants were killed when our columns recaptured the Aung-myay Hill that evening.

Frontline Sixth Burma Rifles Battalion (Tha-na-ka 6)

September 23

TOC-881 Commander Colonel Ye Myint had immediately sent four rifle platoons of Sixth Burma Rifles’ First Column led by the battalion CO Lt. Col. San Thein kept as the reserve at Maing-khat to Maing-yang that day once the news of the Maing-yang Battle reached him.

Frontline Sixth Burma Rifles’ First Column and its four platoons left Maing-khat on the midday that day.

September 24

The Column engaged with some enemy forces and reached Maing-laway the morning of September 24. They merged with some units form IB-11’s First Company at Maing-lway and continued on towards Maing-yang. At around 1 in the afternoon 200 strong enemy attacked our column and after the ensuing battle our forces withdrew back to Maing-lway to re-gather the troops.

September 25

As the Column left Main-lway again and trying to march towards Maing-yang the strong enemy forces waiting at Maing-lway Pha-yar Hill attacked again. The battle lasted the whole day and our column was unable to forward as they were held up in Maing-lway.

September 26

On September 26 our Sixth Burma Rifles’ First Column merged with the IB-11’s First Company at Maing-lway and continued onto Maing-yang. On the way our Column was engaged by 150 strong enemy but they were repelled.

September 27

On September 27, with the heavy-weapon support our column attacked the nearby range occupied by more than 200 strong enemy forces. The enemy finally withdrew towards north.

September 28-29

Our Sixth Burma Column chased the withdrawing enemy and forced most of them to withdraw farther towards east. Our Column occupied the strategic hills around Maing-lway and provided heavy-weapon fire support to the TOC-881 and Frontline IB-14 during the last few days of the Maing-yang Battle.

The Second Battle of Maing-yang was truly over by September 30 as all enemy forces were cleared not just from the Maing-yang Town but also from its surrounds.

Conclusion of the Second Battle of Maing-yang

We had lost 4 officers and 46 other ranks in the main Battle alone. Nine officers and 111 other ranks were wounded. 202 bodies were left by the CPB and according to the radio intercepts and local intelligence at least a thousand were wounded on the enemy side.

As soon as the battle was over LID-88 Commander Brigadier Thein Han traveled to Maing-yang by helicopter and met all the army men there for encouraging congratulations. He also met up with the town folks and thanked them for their help during the siege.

After that he brought Major Tin Aung Myint Oo and other seriously wounded back with him to Kengtung for preliminary medical treatment and then sent the severely wounded to the General Military Hospital at Mingaladon in Rangoon.

The whole IB-11 from Maing-yang was later brought back to Kengtung for a well deserved R&R while the Frontline Sixth Burma Rifles Battalion took on the garrison duty at maing-yang.

The Second Maing-yang Battle was the last major battle of Burmese Communist Party on  Burmese soil. Having huge casualties especially among the majority Wa ranks-and-files from their armed-units the ethnic Wa leaders finally rebelled against the ethnic Burmese leadership of CPB in early 1989.

The Wa captured Pang-sang the CPB HQ in April 1989 and immediately asked our Army for a ceasefire agreement. The spectacular and sudden implosion of CPB after more than 40 years long armed-rebellion in 1989 April was basically the direct result of Second Maing-yang Battle in 1988 September.

The Second Battle of Maing-yang was a strategic turning point in the unfortunate history of long-running Civil War in Burma.

Official Summary for decorating Tin Aung Myint Oo

Despite his serious wounds Major Tin Aung Myint Oo had led his battalion into the battle of Maing-yang occurred from 23-09-1988 to 29-09-1988 when his battalion commander was killed on 23-09-1988.

Being an exemplary commander he had repelled almost countless times the overwhelming CPB bayonet-charges conducted repeatedly with enemy’s massive manpower and heavy-weapon support.

Whenever the air-support arrived he also correctly guided our airforce planes to the precise locations of CPB heavy-weapon crew and thus produced heavy damages on the enemy side and finally turned the battle to our favor.

In addition he had bravely led the battalion during the whole duration of the battle, constantly encouraged the warring men, continuously communicated with the Commands and reported the battle situations, and actively searched the enemy targets for the aerial attacks, all while enemy heavy-weapon shells were falling and exploding all around him and his men.

The Great Victory (4)

Maing-yang Battle(Young Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was awarded the Thiha-Thura medal)

September 17

After being completely quiet for two days on September 15 and 16 the enemy shelled our positions with 82mm Mortars and .50 heavy machine guns from morning to midday on September 17 as more than 1,000 strong Communist forces from their brigade-768 and 815 finally arrived at West Maing-yang.

Only when IB-11 responded with heavy-weapons CPB stopped shelling and withdrew back to the west of the town. Next 4-5 days CPB forces had waited for the arrive of more troops and heavy-weapons and by September 22 the CPB strength in the vicinity of Maing-yang reached to more than 2,000.

September 23

The news from the townfolks confirmed that all the CPB forces destined for the battle were at Maing-yang by then. From the night of September 22 the CPB heavy-weapon units now in the west and south of the town were constantly shelling the army positions till the morning of September 23.

In the morning of September 23 about 200 strong CPB force charged at the La-min Hill. Their four bayonet charges were repelled by the two army platoons on the hill with the help of our heavy-weapon fire from the main Aung-da-ghun Hill.

But the enemy had reinforced their attacking force with 200 more men and kept on charging at the hill. Outnumbered and outgunned our units finally abandoned the La-min Hill and withdrew back to the main Aung-da-ghun Hill.

Meanwhile, a 100 strong CPB unit attacked the army platoon on the Yan-shin Hill from the south-west and the platoon had to abandon the hill and withdrew back to the main Aung-da-ghun Hill.

Once the enemy had occupied the La-min and Yan-shin hills they brought their 57mm recoilless guns and .50 caliber heavy machine guns onto the hill and started their heavy-weapon assault on the Aung-da-ghun Hill where the IB-11’s HQ and its First Column was.

They also shelled the nearby Pha-yar Hill. At about 11 in the late morning at least 400 of them had bayonet-charged the Pha-yar Hill repeatedly for six times. During the sixth charge our Lieutenant Thant Zin the post in-charge was severely wounded and the army unit there had to abandon the hill and withdrew back to the main Aung-da-ghun Hill.

Once they got hold of all three hills, La-min and Yan-shin and Pha-yar hills, the enemy had put their heavy-weapons on those hills and unleashed heavy barrages onto the Aung-da-ghun Hill their main target. Our hill also returned the enemy fire with our 60mm and 80mm mortars.

Enemy’s 500 strong infantry under the protection of their heavy-weapon support then bayonet-charged the Aung-da-ghun Hill from all possible directions. IB-11 CO Major Soe Lwin ordered his men to fire at the charging enemy with 84mm Carl-Gustav launcher.

That launcher was a very effective weapon but the CO himself was required to supervise the firing. Knowing that fact the enemy had immediately responded by firing all their straight-shooting 57mm small recoilless guns together at our launcher site.

And at about 5 in the late afternoon of September 23 the battalion CO Major Soe Lwin was instantly killed by a shell fired from one of enemy’s 57mm recoilless guns. 

Once the CO had fallen the Deputy CO Major Tin Aung Myint Oo who was severely wounded in the September 14 attack on his Aung-tha-byay Hill and brought back temporarily to Aung-da-ghun Hill had taken charge of the under-siege battalion and led the hand-to-hand battles against overwhelming CPB forces now surrounding the Hill and repeatedly bayonet-charging the defenders.

September 24

Once they knew that more than 2,000 CPB forces were now attacking Maing-yang Major Sein Aye and his company previously active as a mobile column near Aung-tha-byay Hill moved in and merged with IB-11 Second Column on the Aung-myay Hill in the evening of September 23.

From there they marched further into town towards the Aung-da-ghun Hill. At about 5:30 in the early morning of September 24 they engaged a more than 300 strong enemy units near the Aung-da-ghun Hill and a huge battle had ensued.

But the Company managed to forcefully penetrate through the enemy lines and merged with our forces on the Aung-da-ghun Hill at about 6:30 in the morning.

By then the enemy infantry circling the Aung-da-ghun Hill were repeatedly bayonet-charging at the hill while their heavy-weapon teams on the nearby La-min and Yan-shin and Pha-yar hills were constantly shelling as fire-support.

But, about 8 in the morning our aerial support arrived in the form of four PC-7 fighter-bomber planes from our Air Force. The planes had arrived just in time as the CPB forces were on the verge of their final bayonet-charge to completely finish off the rapidly weakening defenders on the Aung-da-ghun Hill.

Because of our aerial bombardment the enemy charge had temporarily stopped. But once the airplanes departed after dropping all their bombs and firing their rockets CPB forces unleashed the second bayonet charge.

Our planes had come back again and launched the second aerial bombardment and that second assault took out so many of their men and stopped the enemy bayonet-charges for that day.

September 25

On September 25 enemy began to attack Aung-da-ghun Hill very early on 5:30 in the morning while their heavy-weapon teams on the surrounding hills basically held down our forces on the Aung-myay Hill by shelling constantly.

Between 7 and 9 in the morning that day they had bayonet-charged our Aung-da-ghun Hill eleven times. The fences were breached and hand-to-hand combats were all over the hill as enemy was able to reach inside the army camp.

But our air-support timely arrived at about 9:30 that morning and bombed the enemy just outside our camp. That aerial bombardment achieved so many direct hits and punished enemy so hard that they were forced to stop their brutal bayonet-charges for that day.

Casualties were high for both sides that day as almost everything on the hill was destroyed. Dead and dying from both sides filled the Hill and their blood had formed large pools on the Hill.

Enemy appeared to have used all available forces to overrun our forces on the Aung-da-ghun Hill that day. But because of our air-support the momentum of enemy attack was basically halted on that same day.

September 26

Enemy had reinforced their depleting forces on the recently occupied hills with new arrivals and started attacking our hills again. But at midday that day our air force planes came and repeatedly bombed enemy positions on the Yan-bauk Hill and On-lar-gyaw range.

The devastated enemy then carried their wounded and withdrew towards Wan-kyin-san-dauk. Like the day before enemy was severely beaten by aerial bombardment again that day and because of high casualties they couldn’t bayonet-charge as many times as yesterday.

September 27

On September 27 enemy had given up on attacking Aung-da-ghun Hill. Instead their about 300 strong force attacked our Aung-myay Hill the whole day from about 6:30 in the early morning.

Finally they broke through the fences but our forces repelled them by blowing them up with controlled-mines. At dusk the enemy had bayonet-charged the hill again, but had to withdraw again after suffering heavy losses.

That evening LID-88 HQ had ordered the IB-11 Second Column at Aung-myay Hill to   merge with IB-11 HQ and its First Column at Aung-da-ghun Hill. At 7 in the night of September 28 Major Phe Chit’s Company of IB-11 Second Column abandoned the Aung-myay Hill and marched towards Aung-da-ghun Hill.

That column was shot at by enemy from the Mon-ke-pha-yar Hill and On-la-gyaw Range at the east of Maing-yang Town. But the Second Column had successfully cleared the enemy along their way and reached Aung-da-ghun Hill in the morning of September 28.

September 28

By September 28 all four companies of IB-11 in Maing-yang town were together on the main Aung-da-ghun Hill the battalion’s frontline HQ. They had consolidated their defense lines and repositioned their men and their heavy-weapons. And they had eagerly waited for the enemy bayonet-charges they thought were coming again like the days before.

By then CPB also had re-distributed their forces on various hills under their control. There were about 300 men each on Aung-myay and Aung-tha-byay hills, nearly 100 on the On-la-gyaw Range, and about 300 each on Pha-yar and La-min and Yan-shin hills. They were still shelling our Aung-da-ghun Hill with Heavy-weapons but not as frequent as before.

That day our air force planes showed up again. The PC-7 fighter-bombers then dropped bombs and fired rockets onto the enemy heavy-weapon positions. The results were so many direct hits on their heavy-weapon crews.

Later we heard that the enemy morale had completely collapsed after suffering heavy casualties from that aerial attack and they stopped the shelling of Aung-da-ghun Hill still standing after so many brutal, human-wave bayonet-charges.

September 29

There were no more enemy bayonet-charges onto the Aung-da-ghun Hill as our air force planes were constantly attacking the CPB positions on their hills. The news of massive CPB casualties including some of their top leaders had reached even to our forces on the Aung-da-ghun Hill. By the midnight of September 29 the Miang-yang Town was completely quiet as enemy firing had stopped.

September 30

As there were no more hostile shootings from the enemy DCO Major Tin Aung Myint Oo sent out the rifle company led by Captain Thant Zin to Pha-yar Hill first. They cleared the Hill and found 25 enemy corpses there.

They continued onto the Yan-shin Hill and then La-min Hill and found 71 more enemy corpses in the area. The CPB forces had already gone from Maing-yang since the night of September 29. And the enemy had taken their wounded with them. But they had left their dead comrades at wherever they fell. 

The Great Victory (3)

Maing-yang Battle(Young Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was awarded the Thiha-Thura medal)

All together more than 2,000 troops supported by 60mm, 80mm, and 120mm assorted heavy mortars, 57mm and 75mm recoilless guns, .50 heavy duty machine guns, and hundreds of RPG launchers.

Their strategic dream was to set up the Maing-yang based Provisional People’s Government once they got hold of the town and then to expand their so-called liberated area of Burma form there.

The only obstacle for those more than 2,000 strong Communist forces to successfully implement their grand plan was the less than 400 strong troops of Burmese Army Frontline Infantry Battalion-11 on the garrison duty then at Maing-yang.

Burmese Army then had following units inside the Sector north of Kengtung covering a very large area.

The HQ and the Heavy-weapon company of frontline IB-11’s First Column was on the garrison duty in Maing-yang Town. Their fortified base was on the Aung-da-ghun Hill inside the town.

Another rifle company of frontline IB-11’s First Column was active as a mobile column between Maing-yang and Si-loo.

A rifle company of frontline IB-11’s Second Column was on the garrison duty at the Aung-tha-byay and Aung-myay Hills on the eastern outskirt of Maing-yang Town.

Another rifle company of frontline IB-11’s Second Column was active as a mobile column near those Aung-tha-byay and Aung-myay Hills.

All together 4 companies of IB-11 were in the Maing-yang Town while another rifle company of frontline IB-11 was on the garrison duty in nearby Maing-lway between Maing-khat and Maing-yang.

The HQ of Tactical Operations Command 881 (TOC-881) and three rifle companies of frontline Sixth Burma Rifles Battalion’s First Column were at Maing-khat.

Another rifle company of frontline Sixth Burma Rifles Battalion’s Second Column was active as a mobile reserve column in the areas of Lwe-yote, Lwe-mee, and Wanterpang.

The HQ and a rifle company of frontline First Kayah Rifles Battalion’s First Column were on the Kyat-u-taung (Egg Mountain).

Another rifle company of frontline First Kayah Rifles Battalion’s First Column was active as a mobile column in the area north of Kyat-u-taung (Egg Mountain).

The HQ of frontline LID-88 (Light Infantry Division-88) with the five companies of frontline IB-14 was in the Kengtung City.

Organization wise, LID-88 had 3 Tactical Operations Command, TOC-881 and 882 and 883, and each TOC had 3 infantry battalions. With one reserve battalion the LID-88 had 10 infantry battalions in total. Back in 1988 the three rifle battalions of TOC-881 were IB-11 in Maing-yang and Sixth Burma Rifles Battalion and First Kayah Rifles Battalion both in Maing-khat. The LID-88’s reserve battalion then was IB-14 in Kengtung.

Since the beginning of September 1988 Communist forces were active in the immediate surrounds of Maing-yang Town. Their troops from Pang-sang were moving down south towards Maing-yang. The local rumors of imminent attack on the town were popping up here and there too.

Accordingly the LID-88 HQ in Kengtung sent up two companies from IB-19 which arrived in Kengtung just two days before the Maing-yang Battle to the Maing-yang area. Unfortunately that IB-19 column was ambushed by the CPB advanced forces just before Mine-lway and their Battalion CO was killed and the column could not reach the target.

Since early September even before the actual Battle broke out CPB forces were testing our forces at Maing-yang. By frequent engagements with the army patrols they were gradually closing onto the town. Three enemy columns were seen approaching Maing-yang from both east and west of the town. 

In the morning on the first day of the battle the enemy began to attack the Aung-tha-byay Hill the garrison base of IB-11’s Second Column led by the DCO Major Tin Aung Myint Oo.

The mobile company there had repelled the CPB attackers and chased them but another CPB unit 100 strong was waiting for them at the Wan-kyone Monastery south of Aung-tha-byay Hill. The battle ensued and the army company had to withdraw back to the Aung-tha-byay Hill.

Another 100 more CPB troops arrived at the monastery and with the heavy-weapon support they attacked the Aung-tha-byay hill again. The ensuing battle lasted whole day and only at night the enemy withdrew as they couldn’t overrun the army’s strong defense positions.

CPB seemed to be just testing the strength of IB-11 Second Column as their preliminary attack before the arrival of their main forces. That day DCO Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was hit on his right wrist by a heavy-weapon shell’s shrapnel and severely wounded with his right hand broken.

The Great Victory (2)

Maing-yang Battle(Young Major Tin Aung Myint Oo was awarded the Thiha-Thura medal)

After losing the huge battle at Si-si Wanterpang in 1986 the Communists were devastated. CPB had started that Battle as a morale boasting show of their strength and military capability after the Chinese Communist Party had cut off their arms and manpower support to the Myanmar Communists.

Chairman Mao was dead and the new paramount leader (Black Cat/White Cat) Deng Xiao Ping wanted to reinvent China and CPB was in the way in rebuilding good neighborly relationship between China and Myanmar.

But instead of gaining the new territory CPB had lost Kyu-kote, Pang-saing, Mang-hiro, Kung-haing, and Naung-mah their important territories by the borderline to the Burmese Army. The architect and overall leader of that battle Yebaw Aung (a) Blackie Bo Myo Myint had to flee back to his sanctuary in China with his tail between the legs.

Because of unfavorable situations the CPB Central Committee even had to abolish its War Myanmar and armed-Divisions and wait for better situations again. And their fortunate time came in 1988.

A student uprising had started in Yangon on March 12, 1988 when Phone Maw a student from RIT (Rangoon(Yangon) Institute of Technology) was killed in the police operation after a teashop brawl near RIT.

Back then Yebaw Htun (a) Bo Kyin Maung (current CPB General Secretary) from CPB Northern Bureau was the boss of Communist UG or Underground operations in the major cities like Rangoon and Mandalay. He has set up CPB UG cells nationwide to create disturbances as the opportunity arises.

All his long Communist life Bo Kyin Maung has managed the UG operation for CPB and he prefers the UG revolution to the armed revolution.  So in the crucial times of 1988 he became fervently active with the support of CPB Chairman Ba Thein Tin on the border to bring down Ne Win’s BSPP Socialist Government in Yangon. And he finally did. Myanmar’s Socialist Government fell in September 1988.

8-8-88 Uprising actually was initiated and participated by the CPB UG cells in Rangoon. Having known the situations very well Chairman Ba thein Tin had taken full advantage of the public disturbances and planned for the eventual Communist takeover of the State Power.

CPB Radio had broadcasted many declarations for the support of Uprising. And the protesting students were praised as the revolutionary heroes in their broadcasts. CPB Central Committee had even moved down from remote Pang-sang to Mone-koe which was easily communicable from all over the country.

A CPB Politburo meeting was staged at Mone-koe and detail plans to snatch the State power were drawn up there.  

“If we can go in and skillfully handle the current political situation in Yangon I am certain that we will achieve the State Power,” said CPB Chairman Ba Thein Tin with confidence.

As the planned two-prone attack CPB had gathered its armed units and also stockpiled arms and ammunitions in the jungle camps by the Chinese border for the imminent assault on the Government forces while its UG cells and clandestine Radio were stoking hard the flames of Uprising in Yangon and other cities.

But the CPB was caught short when the Army took over the Government on September 18, 1988 and brought down the nationwide disturbances under control and rapidly re-established law and order with deadly force. So they began a propaganda war on their radio.

“Democracy is brutally terminated. Pick up any weapon and fight against the military government. Follow the Chairman Mao’s teachings and grab the power by force,” broadcasted constantly by the CPB Radio.

“We shouldn’t be waiting too long. Before too late, with the forces already gathered we must attack a winnable place and take hold of it,” directed Ba Thein Tin to his Communist cadres and officers.

Even though he had been in Mone-koe directing the UG operations since early September 1988, once the army has taken over the country Ba Thein Tin rushed back from Mone-koe to Pang-sang. And as soon as he was there he ordered the CPB Central War Commission to launch the battle.

CPB War Commission already had a detail plan to attack Maing-yang the nearest town from their Pang-sang and they’d been waiting for the green light from Chairman Ba Thein Tin. Thus the Second Battle of Maing-yang began in the early morning of September 23, 1988 when more than 2,000 strong CPB forces came into Maing-yang.

I would like to describe the geography of Maing-yang the last major target of CPB before its sudden implosion just a few months later.

The little town Maing-yang was located roughly between the Latitude 99 and 100 degrees and between the Longitude 21 and 22 degrees in the Eastern Shan State. It is at the North of Kengtung the capital of Eastern Shan State and 65 miles away from Kengtung. It is only 30 or 40 miles away from the People Republic of China.

During the old feudal times Maing-yang was ruled by a Town-Lord (Phayar-Yang) under the Sawbwa (Saopha) of Kengtung (Kyaing Tong). The populace of Maing-yang consists mainly of Li-shan, Gon-shan, Akha-lahu, Lishaw, and Wa people.

Maing-yang is the most northern town of Eastern Shan State. Even though it was only 65 miles away from Kengtung, to reach there was extremely difficult as the roads were bad. By car it normally took 4 to 5 hours from Kengtung. The Kengtung-Maingyang vehicular road passes through Wanterpun, Maing-khat, and Maing-lway.

The town basically is on a small valley plain surrounded by high mountains with the soaring heights of 3, 4, and 5,000 feet. In Shan language Yang is a plain and Maing-yang basically means a town built on the plain land. But there are small hillocks at the western outskirt of the town.

At the north of Maing-yang were Ho-tong and Maing-phyan and at the west is Maing-pauk all of which were Brown Territories (Insurgent-controlled areas). At the east is Si-loo also a CPB-controlled area. At the south are Main-khat and Kengtung.

Maing-yang basically was a sweet fruit surrounded by thorny bushes and CPB picked the small town many times to test our troops garrisoned there. And in the early morning on 19 April 1980 nearly 1,500 strong CPB forces attacked the three army companies from the First Column of LIB-108 (Light Infantry Battalion-108) on the garrison duty at Maing-yang.

The battle lasted more than six hours that day, but the numerically superior CPB forces couldn’t overrun our strong defense and finally had to withdraw. The casualties from both sides were 79 from the army and 194 from the CPB for that First Maing-yang Battle.

Now the CPB was preparing again for the Second battle of Maing-yang and their last major battle on our Myanmar soil.

In early September 1988 the extended War Commission of CPB had a war meeting in Pang-sang. The meeting was attended by Lin Htin (a) Yebaw Soe Thein, the Political Commissar of North-East War Region, Yebaw Ohn Kyi, the Military Commander of Northern Bureau, Yebaw Kyi Myint, the Deputy Military Commander of Northern Bureau, Yebaw Htun Lwin, a brigade commander from Northern Bureau, and Yebaw Soe Lin, the Chief of War Region 815.

That meeting had decided to attack Maing-yang and formed the eleven person supervising committee headed by Lin Htin (a) Yebaw Soe Thein for the battle. And the following CPB troops were assigned for the battle.

Battalion-4048 of the First Brigade.

Battalion-501 of the Third Brigade.

Battalion-081, 085, and 087 of the Fifth Brigade.

Battalion-503 of the Seventh Brigade.

Battalion-083 of the Eighth Brigade.

Battalion-3, 6, and 9 of Brigade-815.

Troops extracted from Brigade-851 aka the Guard Brigade, CPB Central.